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KENTUCKY LAW, JOURNAL
SELF INCRIMINATION-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE DOCTRINE
The early English history of our present day privilege against
self-incrimination is indeed a strange one. It is a long story
"woven across a tangled warp composed in part of the inventions
of the early canonists, of the momentous contest between the
courts of the common law and of the church, and of the political
and religious issue of that convulsive period in English history,
the days of the dictatorial Stuarts."' For purposes of discussion,
the history and development of the doctrine will be broken down
into two distinct periods. First, the history of the opposition to
the ex officio oath of the ecclesiastical courts; second, the history
of the opposition to the criminating questions in the common law
courts.
The greatest result of the Norman Conquest was the introduc-
tion of precise and orderly methods into the government and law
of England. Prior to the coming of William the Conqueror, the
bishops under the Anglo-Saxon rule had acted as the judges in
the popular courts. But Duke William was quick to change this
type of judical system. William, by an ordinance, insisted that
the bishops should not transact ecclesiastical business in the popu-
lar courts, but should hold their own Christian Courts. From that
day to this the Church has maintained its separate system of
courts administering canon law. Church and State, which had
been inextricably connected in the Anglo-Saxon Age, henceforth
were strictly separated. Thus, having become separate systems,
it was natural that a hot conflict should develop as to the limits
and bounds of jurisdiction between the papal and regal powers.
This was the great question during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. "The statute 'De Articulis Ceri' settled the line of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over laymen by confining it to causes
matrimonial and testamentary; and this in substance prevailed till
the end of church courts in England."'
Once the jurisdictional point was settled the next question to
be faced was: how were the papal courts to proceed in the cases
where they had acquired jurisdiction? Under Anglo-Saxon rule,
18 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 277 (3d ed. 1940).2Id. at 279.
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the trial by compurgation, or formal swearing of the party with
oath helpers, and the trial by ordeal had been the common
methods of ecclesiastical trial and decision. In the early thirteenth
century these methods were done away with, and in their stead
the inquisitional or interrogatory oath came into being under the
auspices of Pope Innocent III. 3 The ancient compurgation oath
had operated as a formal appeal to the divine; there was no inter-
rogation by the tribunal; the process consisted merely in daring
the accused to pronounce his innocence under oath. But the new
interrogatory oath pledged the accused to answer truly, and this
was followed by a rational process of judical probing by questions
to the specific detail of the affair, essentially similar to the modem
examination of witnesses in a trial. The former oath operated of
itself as a decision, through the party's own act; the latter merely
furnished material for the judge to reach a personal conviction
and decision.
The function of the ecclesiastical courts was to punish for
offenses against religion and morals, in a word, to punish sin as
such. Their use of the inquisitio, or proceeding ex officio mero, is
probably best known for the role it played in heresy trials. It was
in this use that the ex officio oath was brought to the peoples'
attention, when in the headlong pursuit of heretics and schisi-
matics under Elizabeth and James, it was used by the ecclesiastical
courts without even the use of witnesses or of presentment of
charges against those brought before the court. An oath which
was lawful enough on Innocent III's conditions had degenerated
into a merely unlawful process of poking about in the speculation
of finding something chargeable.
During the time of Henry IV a statute was passed, which gave
temporal sanction to the Church's claims in the field of heresy.
This statute voiced no objection to the oath or to the ex officio
procedure, but rather was a sanction of the Church's usual rule,
which it pursued with great vigor for more than a century.
4
This type of procedure in the ecclesiastical courts was in con-
tinuous use with little interruption till the year 1640. More and
more it became unpopular. The resistance provoked by the in-
tense unpopularity of this method of procedure brought the whole
3 WGMOE, PANORA OF Trm WoRLDs LEGAL SYsTEMS 953 (1936).
WIMOm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 285.
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system to the ground. "The Ecclesiastical Courts were totally
abolished in 1640 and though they were revived in 1661, their
procedure was so much altered, especially by the abolition of the
ex-officio oath, that they have fallen into almost entire disuse
for all practical purposes except the displine of the clergy."5
It is interesting to note at this point that the disfavor an-
nounced in popular discussion concerning the oath and its use in
the ecclesiastical courts was not the fact that a man must in-
criminate himself, but rather the lack of a presentment or a speci-
fic charge.
John Lilburn, an obstreperous and forward opponent of the
Stuarts, has been accredited with having brought to a culmina-
tion the use of the ex officio oath. The Star Chamber, a court or-
ganized about 1487 and which had broad jurisdiction over all
classes of crimes, had charged him with the printing or importing
of heretical and seditious books. He denied these charges and
refused to make an answer to other like charges. For this he was
condemned to be whipped, and the sentence was executed.
Lilburn carried his complaint to Parliament, and in 1648 the
Lords ordered the sentence to be totally vacated as illegal and
most unjust as against the liberty of the subject of the law of the
land and the Magna Carta.' It is well to note, however, that noth-
ing concerning the privilege is mentioned in the Magna Carta.7
Lilburn had never claimed the right to refuse absolutely to
answer a criminating question. He had merely claimed a proper
proceeding of accusation or presentment.' But the trial of John
Lilburn9 had focused the attention of the whole of England upon
the proceedings in the Star Chamber, High Commission and other
courts using ex officio proceedings, wherein persons accused were
forced by oath or other compulsion to speak truly and confess
their own delinquency. The obstinancy on the part of John Lil-
burn in refusing to take the oath or to answer against himself was
merely representative of a like attitude on the part of hundreds
of others who likewise refused to be sworn, or, being sworn,
2 STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF THE ClnumNAL LAw oF ENGLAND 220 (1883).
* 8 WIGNIORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291.
'Anderson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 74 N.Y.L. REV. 453, 455
(1940).
( 8 WIGIORE, oP. cit. supra note 1, at 298.
' For an account of the trial see, STEPHEN, HISTORY OF Tna CnRINAL LAW oF
ENGLAND 343 (1883).
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refused to answer. Thus, amid the loud voices of opposition,
Parliament in 1641, by statute, abolished the courts of the Star
Chamber and of the High Commission, and the ex officio oath to
answer criminal charges as used in these courts was swept away
with them.'0
At this point attention will be turned to the common law
courts. The seventeenth century in English legal history gave
us many of our existent institutions, and it is not strange, there-
fore, that we should seek in that period some light on the de-
velopment of a maxim which today has become well rooted in
our federal and state constitutions.
Not long after Parliament abolished the oath ex officio and its
attendant compulsory examinations from the ecclesiastical courts,
attention was focused upon the justification for the common law
courts to exercise such widespread authority. The result was an
increasing general reaction resulting in a strong conviction that
no person should be bound to incriminate himself on any charge
in any court. Common law courts began to concede this public
distaste, first in criminal trials and later in civil proceedings. The
oath, however, continued to be used intermittently and was not
finally abolished until after the Revolution of 1688.11 By the latter
part of the seventeenth century the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was so well established that apparently Parliament con-
sidered it unnecessary to include it in the Bill of Rights.'
2
While this English doctrine was developing, a contemporary
struggle across the Channel in France is in marked contrast by
its opposite results. The Council of Louis XIV, in drafting the
great Criminal Ordonnance of 1670, fixed the French rule of com-
pulsory self-incrimination. 3 By this ordinance Louis XIV crys-
tallized the inquisitorial procedure which had been developing
for three centuries under the influence of the example of the
church courts, the revived interest in the Roman law, and the
increasing powers of the king. It endowed France with the clear-
est and most vigorous expression of the inquisitorial procedure
that the secular courts in Europe had ever known.
o 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 292, and footnote 69.1 STEPHEN, HisTony OF THE CAnNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 440 (1883).
'Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 774 (1935).
' 8 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at footnote 107.
KENTUCKY LAW JoumNAL
The settlement of the American colonies took place about
the time in English history when opposition to the oath ex offico
of the ecclesiastical courts was most pronounced, and when the
insistence upon the privilege against self-incrimination in the
common law courts had begun to have its effect. But contrary to
popular belief, the colonists did not immediately adopt the doc-
trine allowing the privilege against self-incrimination. It remained
an unknown doctrine during a whole generation in the Colony of
Massachusetts, 1 4 where, as late as 1685, the interrogatory oath
was permitted. 5 But by the time the Union was formed, the
doctrine had become accepted as a part of the common law and
was firmly entrenched in the hearts and minds of our forefathers.
Mr. Justice Moody, in Twining v. New Jersey,", commenting on
the early history of the privilege in this country said:
The exemption from testimonial compulsion, that is, from
disclosure as a witness of evidence against oneself, forced
by any form of legal process, is universal in American law,
though there may be differences as to its exact scope and
limits. At the time of the formation of the Union the prin-
ciple that no person could be compelled to be a witness
against himself had become embodied in the common law
and distinguished it from all other systems of jurisprudence.
It was generally regarded then, as now, as a privilege of
great value, a protection of the innocent though a shelter
to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded
or tyrannical prosecutions. Five of the original 13 States
(North Carolina, 1776; Pennsylvania, 1776; Virginia, 1776;
Massachusetts, 1780; New Hampshire, 1784) had then
guarded the principle from legislative or judical change
by including it in constitutions or bills of rights; . . . and
in the remainder of those states there seems to be no doubt
that it was recognized by the courts. The privilege was not
included in the Federal Constitution as originally adopted,
but was placed in one of the Ten Amendments which were
recommended to the States by the first Congress, and by
them adopted. Since then all the states of the Union have
from time to time, with varying form but uniform meaning,
included the privilege in their Constitutions, except the
states of New Jersey and Iowa, and in those states it is held
to be part of the existing law.' 7
'1 HAIT, A_mcAN -IsToRY TOLD By CONTEMPonAniES 882 (1926).
IBnADFoB,'s HISTORY OF A PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 465 (1899).
18211 U.S. 78 (1908). '"Id. at 91.
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In the case of Brown v. Walker, Mr. Justice Brown said:
So deeply did the inquities of the ancient system impress
themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that
the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to
question an accused person a part of their fundamental law,
so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evi-
dence, became clothed in this country with the impregna-
bility of a constitutional enactment.' 8
In conclusion, it is well to keep in mind not only the original
purpose of the doctrine or privilege,' 9 but also the policy which is
thought to justify its existence at the present time. As to the
policy behind the rule, it is contended that it exists as a protec-
tion for the innocent; that it forces a more diligent search for
extrinsic evidence; that it is a protection against overzealous
young district attorneys; and that any system of judicial adminis-
tration which permits the prosecution to habitually trust to com-
pulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer
morally thereby. On the other hand, it is as strongly objected
that the privilege protects the guilty by unduly hampering
criminal prosecution, and leads to the mischief of immunity
statutes in order to secure otherwise unobtainable evidence.20 It
has ever been contended that the privilege has outlived its use-
fulness.2-
Around the privilege against self-incrimination a long and
violent controversy has raged. Undoubtedly, the privilege pro-
tects the guilty. Yet to say that it should be eradicated for that
reason is naive. The law does not recognize subjective innocence
or guilt; both are matters of objective proof. On the other hand,
those who would defend it need not conjure up the spectre of the
conviction of the innocent. That is an unreal nightmare. 2
" 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
"The main purpose of the provision was to prohibit the compulsory oral
examination of provisions before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in crime." People v.
Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003, 1005 (1894)." It may also become an additional incentive for law enforcement officers
... tosit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into the poor devils eyes
rather than go about in the sun hunting up evidence.' STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CmrNA. LAW OF ENGLAND 442, fn. 1 (1883) quoting the observations of a
British officer concerning a practice of native police officers of India.
- See BENTnAm, RATIONALE OF JunIcAL EVIDENCE, B. IX, PT. IV c. III, as
cited in 8 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 305.
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (1923).
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And yet, the privilege in most of its aspects seems well worth
preserving. It is best defended, not as an unchangeable principle
of universal justice, but as a doctrine proved by experience to be
expedient in most cases.23
WEND= r~rS. WMLIAs
HOLOGRAPHIC CODICILS INCORPORATING BY
REFERENCE AND REPUBLISHING INVALID
NON-HOLOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTS
The result reached in a recent case in Oklahoma, Johnson v.
Johnson,1 suggests the need of re-examining the status of the law
as to holographic codicilhiary incorporation by reference and re-
publication.
The case was briefly this: The testator typed numerous be-
quests and devises on a single sheet of paper. This typewritten
portion was not dated, nor did the testator sign his name at the
conclusion thereof, nor was it attested by two witnesses. At the
end of the typewritten portion and on the same page the testator
wrote the following in his handwriting: "To my brother James I
give Ten Dollars only. This will shall be complete unless here-
after altered, changed or rewritten." He signed and dated the
latter, but it was not attested.2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court" held that the written portion
of the instrument constituted a valid holographic codicil which
incorporated the typewritten portion by reference and republished
and validated it as a valid will, as of the date of the codicil. The
court, in upholding the entire sheet of paper as a valid will, re-
lied on the general principle of law that a codicil which is validly
executed will operate as a republication of an earlier will regard-
less of defects which may have existed in the execution of the
earlier document.4 In order to apply this doctrine to the case, the
Oklahoma court concluded that the earlier typewritten portion
was a will although not signed, that the written portion being
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
1279 P. 2d 928 (Okla. 1955).
'Id. at 929.
'Although the decision was styled as a Per Curiam decision, it was rendered
by a 5-8 vote upholding the validity of the will.
' Supra note 1, at 931.
